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THE GAP CREATED BY E-COMMERCE: HOW STATES CAN PRESERVE THEIR
SALES AND USE TAX REVENUE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
© 2012 Jessica Nicole Cory
I. Introduction
Since its inception in 1932, the state sales tax has become an increasingly important
source of revenue for most states, including Oklahoma. 1 Today, forty-five states and the District
of Columbia impose a general sales tax. 2 Nationally, these taxes resulted in $224.5 billion of
revenue in 2010, which, at 31.9% of total state tax collections, represents the second greatest
source of state revenue. 3 Oklahoma collected $5,164,499,000 in revenue in 2010. 4 Of that total,
approximately 38%, or $1,968,309,000, came from general sales taxes. 5 States that do not
impose a state income tax—such as Florida, Nevada, Texas, and Washington—rely even more
heavily on sales tax dollars, with sales taxes generating a majority of their tax revenues. 6
Retail sales taxes, or simply “sales taxes,” are a levy on the sale of tangible, personal
property, imposed on a transaction-by-transaction basis, measured by the “sales price” or “gross

1

The Growth of State and Local Sales Taxation, in WALTER HELLERSTEIN, HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN: STATE TAXATION ¶ 12.02 (3d. ed. 2011), available at 1999 WL 1398963, at *1
[hereinafter Growth of Sales Taxation].
2
Only Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon have no general sales tax.
MELISSA BRAYBROOKS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS
SUMMARY REPORT: 2010, at 3 (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/2010stcreport.pdf [hereinafter 2010 SUMMARY REPORT].
3
General sales taxes were second only to revenue from individual income taxes, which
accounted for 33.5% of total tax revenue. Id. at 3 fig. 1.
4
Id. at app. tbl. A-1.
5
Id.
6
Growth of Sales Taxation, supra note 1, ¶ 12.02, available at 1999 WL 1398963, at *1.
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proceeds” of the sale.7 Generally, although the consumer bears the economic incidence of the
tax, the vendor, or seller, collects and remits the appropriate amount of sales tax to the state.8
Because states only have jurisdiction to impose sales taxes on transactions occurring within their
borders, states impose a complementary tax known as the “use tax” to prevent tax evasion. 9 The
use tax is a levy upon “the use, storage, or other consumption in the state of tangible personal
property that has not been subjected to a sales tax,” generally measured by the “cost price,”
“purchase price,” or “fair market value” of the property brought into the state.10 The sales tax
and use tax work together to ensure that all purchases of tangible personal property, whether
transacted within or outside of the state, are subject to a uniform tax burden. 11 This diminishes
the possibility of tax avoidance through out-of-state purchases and protects local businesses from
out-of-state competitors that can offer lower prices because of lower or nonexistent sales tax
burdens. 12
Although the use tax imposes a tax on purchases of the same items at the same rate as the
state sales tax, use taxes differ in an important way—unlike sales taxes, where the vendor
collects and remits the tax due, individual purchasers are often responsible for reporting and
remitting any use tax due to their state taxing authority. 13 This individual burden stems from the
Supreme Court‟s decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, in which the Court held that states are
constitutionally prevented from requiring out-of-state sellers to collect and remit sales tax when
7

Introduction to the American Retail Sales Tax, in HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, ¶ 12.01,
available at 1999 WL 1398962, at *2 [hereinafter American Retail Sales Tax]; Introduction to
Chapter 16 – Use Taxes, in HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, ¶ 16.01, available at 1999 WL
1399001, at *4 [hereinafter Introduction].
8
American Retail Sales Tax, supra note 7, ¶ 12.01, available at 1999 WL 1398962, at *2.
9
Introduction, supra note 7, ¶ 16.01, available at 1999 WL 1399001, at *2.
10
Id.
11
67B AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 1.
12
Id. § 134.
13
Zelda Ferguson, Is the Tax Holiday Over for Online Sales?, 63 TAX LAW. 1279, 1281 (2010).
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those vendors do not have a substantial nexus with—or physicial presence within—the taxing
state.14 Use tax reliance on individual self-reporting can lead to major revenue losses for states.
Not only are many individuals unaware that they are required to remit use tax, others knowingly
fail to remit use taxes because it is almost impossible for states to enforce use tax payment. 15
Given the high dependence of state budgets on sales and use tax revenues, use tax
evasion represents a serious problem, which is only heightened by the incredible growth of ecommerce. Internet purchases are often examples of remote commerce, or transactions that
involve an in-state buyer and an out-of-state seller, making such purchases subject to use tax,
rather than sales tax. Many Internet retailers maintain a nationwide virtual presence but have a
physical presence in only one or two states. Because these sellers frequently do not have the
required nexus with the state where the purchaser resides, they do not have to collect and remit
the use tax imposed by that state on the transaction. Given the low use tax compliance rates by
individual purchasers, the more transactions that take place over the Internet in interstate
commerce, the less revenue states collect.
E-commerce represented 7% of total retail and food sales in 2010 and is predicted to
reach $248.7 billion in revenue by 2014. 16 Some have forecasted an e-commerce sales growth
rate of 9% each year through 2012 despite the recession. 17 The National Conference of State
Legislatures predicts that states will lose an estimated $23.3 billion in 2012 because they are

14

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
Ferguson, supra note 13, at 1281.
16
Online Retail Sales, NAT‟L RETAIL FED‟N, tbls. 1 & 2,
http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Pages&sp_id=1240 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
17
Donald Bruce, William Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local Sales Tax Revenue Losses from
E-Commerce, 52 STATE TAX NOTES 537, 537 (2009).
15
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prohibited from requiring online or catalog vendors to collect and remit sales and use taxes. 18
Others have estimated that there will be annual state and local tax losses from e-commerce of
$11.4-12.65 billion by 2012 for a six-year total loss of $52-56.3 billion. 19 This number increases
by $6.8 billion if losses from sales by other remote vendors, such as mail-order sales, are
included. 20 These revenue losses are particularly troubling because of the major fiscal challenges
states continue to face, despite the beginning of a slow economic recovery this year. 21 Given the
grim fiscal circumstances of the states, the poisonous nature of tax rate increases in the current
political climate, and the major loss of revenue from the failure of individuals to remit use tax, it
is not surprising that states are seeking to circumvent, overturn, or re-interpret the Quill decision
in order to require remote vendors to collect and remit use tax.
Part II of this paper examines the current constitutional restrictions on state taxing
authority as set out in the Supreme Court‟s 1992 Quill decision. The next section, Part III,
introduces the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (the “SSUTA”) and the federal bills
that seek to implement a national solution to the problem created by Quill. Part IV discusses the
different approaches that individual states have taken in attempting to circumvent the restrictions
set out in Quill in the absence of a federal solution. Part V analyzes a new approach, not yet
taken by any state, one that advocates interpreting Quill‟s constitutional restrictions to be
inapplicable if states compensate remote vendors for the cost of collecting and remitting use

18

Collecting E-Commerce Taxes: An Interactive Map, NAT‟L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20274 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
19
Bruce, Fox & Luna, supra note 17, at 537.
20
Id.
21
Elizabeth McNichol, Phil Oliff & Nicholas Johnson, States Continue to Feel Recession‟s
Impact, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL‟Y PRIORITIES (June 17, 2011),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=711.
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taxes. Part VI concludes this note with a brief summary and analysis of the different approaches
states can take in response to Quill.
II. Current Law - Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
A. Setting the Stage for Quill
When the Court decided Quill Corp. v. North Dakota in 1992, it specifically noted that it
was not resolving the case on a blank slate, and that “contemporary Commerce Clause
jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today.” 22
Because the Court‟s Quill opinion emphasized “adherence to settled precedent” and focused on
harmonizing the holdings of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois and
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 23 knowledge of the facts and holdings of those cases is
essential to understanding the Court‟s subsequent decision in Quill.
1. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, arose when the State of
Illinois obtained a judgment from the Illinois Supreme Court that required National Bellas Hess
(“National”), a mail order house incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in
Missouri, to collect and remit use taxes imposed by Illinois. 24 National had no physical
operations or property in Illinois, no employees or sales representatives in Illinois, and did not
advertize by newspaper, billboards, radio, or television in Illinois. 25 The only contacts that
National had with Illinois were through United States mail or common carrier, as twice a year it
mailed catalogues to all of its active and recent customers—including customers in Illinois—in

22

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).
Id. at 309-18.
24
Nat‟l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep‟t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 753-54 (1967).
25
Id. at 754.
23
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addition to mailing out occasional advertising flyers. 26 Customers would then mail orders for
merchandise back to National‟s Missouri plant, with the ordered goods sent back to the
customers by mail or common carrier. 27
Illinois law required all retailers “maintaining a place of business” in Illinois to collect
and remit use tax.28 The state‟s tax code defined a “retailer maintaining a place of business” in
Illinois as one “[e]ngaging in soliciting orders within this state from users by means of
catalogues or other advertising, whether such orders are received and accepted within or without
this State.”29 Under this definition, the Illinois Supreme Court found National‟s mail order
operations sufficient to classify National as a “retailer maintaining a place of business” in
Illinois, and therefore required National to collect and remit Illinois use tax. 30 National
challenged the Illinois statute as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
and the Dormant Commerce Clause. 31 The United States Supreme Court agreed with National
on both grounds and reversed the Illinois Supreme Court, finding the Illinois law
unconstitutional. 32
The Court began by affirming the close relationship of Due Process claims and claims of
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.33 The Court noted that for states to
constitutionally “impose the burdens of collecting use taxes upon interstate sales,” there must be
“some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or

26

Id.
Id. at 754-55.
28
Id. at 755.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 753-55.
31
Id. at 756.
32
Id. at 756-60.
33
Id. at 756.
27
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transaction it seeks to tax.”34 The Court then proceeded to list three separate instances in which
it had upheld the power of states to impose collection and remittance liability on out-of-state
sellers: where the sales were arranged by local agents in the taxing state, where the mail order
seller maintained local retail stores, and where the out-of-state seller had independent contractor
salespersons conducting continuous local solicitation in the taxing state.35
However, the Court emphasized that it “ha[d] never held that a State may impose the duty
of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the
State is by common carrier or the United States mail,” 36 and had in fact ruled that a state could
not constitutionally impose a use tax obligation upon an out-of-state seller whose only contacts
with the taxing state were in-state advertisements and merchandise deliveries. 37 The Court
refused to obliterate the distinction between out-of-state sellers with property, retail outlets, or
solicitors within a state and remote vendors who lack a physical presence within the taxing state
and communicate with customers only through mail or common carrier. 38 The Court feared that
the many political subdivisions authorized to impose use tax and “[t]he many variations in rates
of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping requirements” would
“entangle [] interstate business[es] in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local
jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose „a fair share of the cost of the local
government.‟”39 As such, the imposition of use tax collection and remittance obligations on out-

34

Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
Id. at 757-58.
36
Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
37
Id. (citing Miller Bros., 347 U.S. 340).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 759-60.
35
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of-state retailers without a physical presence in the state was an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 40
2. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady
The issue in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, decided ten years after Bellas Hess,
was whether a Mississippi tax on “„the privilege of … doing business‟ within the State,” as
applied to the taxpayer‟s interstate commerce activities, unconstitutionally burdened interstate
commerce. 41 The taxpayer in Complete Auto was a Michigan corporation that transported
General Motors Corporation vehicles by truck from a Mississippi railway station to Mississippi
dealerships.42 The taxpayer claimed that because “its transportation was but one part of an
interstate movement,” the “taxes assessed and paid were unconstitutional as applied to operations
in interstate commerce.”43 However, the Mississippi Supreme Court sustained the tax, relying on
the taxpayer‟s large business operation in Mississippi that was “dependent on the State for police
protection and other State services the same as other citizens.”44 The state court believed that the
taxpayer should have to “pay its fair share of taxes so long, but only so long, as the tax does not
discriminate against interstate commerce and there is no danger of interstate commerce being
smothered by cumulative taxes of several states.”45
On appeal, the taxpayer relied solely on the “Spector rule,” which prohibited states from
applying a state business privilege tax to an activity that was part of interstate commerce. 46
Conversely, Mississippi cited language from earlier Supreme Court cases that looked to the

40

Id. at 760.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977).
42
Id. at 276.
43
Id. at 277.
44
Id. (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 330 So.2d 268, 272 (Miss. 1976)).
45
Id. (quoting Brady, 330 So.2d at 272).
46
Id. at 278 (citing Spector Motor Serv. v. O‟Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)).
41
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practical effect of a tax statute rather than just its formal language and had held that “[i]t was not
the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their
just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.” 47
Finding the Spector rule merely “a trap for the unwary draftsman,” 48 the Court in
Complete Auto chose to expressly overrule the Spector rule.49 Noting that it had previously
rebutted the proposition that interstate commerce is immune from state taxation, the majority
further rejected the formalism of the Spector rule and chose to adopt a rule with practical
significance and economic consequence.50 The Court then held that states can constitutionally
impose taxes on interstate commerce, so long as the tax (1) is applied to an interstate activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing state (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state. 51
B. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
1. Facts
The facts of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota are similar to those that gave rise to Bellas Hess
over twenty years before.52 Both cases involved state attempts to require an out-of-state mailorder business to collect and remit use tax on goods purchased by state residents for use within
the state.53 In both cases, the taxpayers solicited business in the taxing state through catalogues
and flyers but did not have any tangible property or personnel in the taxing state. 54 Additionally,

47

Id. at 279 (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
Id.
49
Id. at 288-89.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 279, 287.
52
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301 (1992).
53
Id.
54
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 302; Nat‟l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep‟t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753,
754-55 (1967).
48
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in both Bellas Hess and Quill, the state statute required retailers “maintaining a place of business
in” the state to collect and remit the state‟s use tax and defined “retailer” to include mail-order
companies without a physical presence if they solicited business within the state through
catalogues and flyers.55 More specifically, in Quill, the North Dakota statute‟s definition of
“retailer” included “every person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer
market in th[e] state,” meaning anyone who advertised in North Dakota three or more times
within a 12-month period.56
On these facts, the trial court ruled for Quill, the taxpayer, because it found no “nexus to
allow the state to define retailer in the manner it chose,” making this case virtually
indistinguishable from Bellas Hess.57 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed,
holding Bellas Hess constituted an “obsolescent precedent,” and that blindly following it would
result in “ignor[ing] the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations [that
have occurred] since 1967.”58 Factually, the North Dakota Supreme Court highlighted the
incredible growth of the mail order industry, from “a relatively inconsequential market niche into
a goliath” worth $183.3 billion, or 15% of total national retail sales, and the transformative
impact of modern technology on the method of operating a mail-order direct marketing
business. 59 Moreover, the North Dakota court also emphasized changes that had occurred in the
“legal landscape” following the Court‟s decision in Bellas Hess. 60 The court noted that under the
four-pronged test set out in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, as applied in subsequent cases,
the Commerce Clause no longer required the physical-presence nexus standard established in
55

Quill, 504 U.S. at 302-03; Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 755.
Quill, 504 U.S. at 302-03.
57
Id. at 303.
58
North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. 1991).
59
Id. at 208-09.
60
Id. at 209.
56
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Bellas Hess, but looked more broadly at “the relationship between the out-of-state seller‟s
contacts with the state and its establishment and maintenance of sales within the state.”61
Additionally, under the Supreme Court‟s more recent Due Process cases, the “minimum
contacts” and “fair warning” requirements of the Due Process Clause were found satisfied in
personal jurisdiction cases when an out-of-state defendant “„purposefully directed‟ his activities
at residents of the forum” state.62 Because Quill “„purposefully directed‟ its activities at North
Dakota residents,” North Dakota “could, consistent with Due Process” require Quill to collect
and remit use tax.63 The Supreme Court disagreed, and reversed the decision of the North
Dakota Supreme Court.64
2. Opinion
Despite its claim in Bellas Hess that the tests for the Commerce Clause and the Due
Process Clause were “closely related” and “similar,” the Court began its analysis in Quill by
stating that “[t]he two constitutional requirements differ fundamentally in several ways,” as they
“reflect different constitutional concerns” and are therefore “analytically distinct.” 65 Therefore,
it explained, “while a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to
tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause.”66
The Court then proceeded to overrule Bellas Hess‟s due process holding but affirm the brightline physical-presence nexus requirement of Bellas Hess on Commerce Clause grounds.67
a) Due Process Analysis

61

Id. at 210-12.
Id. at 212.
63
Id.
64
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992).
65
Id. at 305.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 308, 317-18.
62
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According to the Court, “[t]he Due Process Clause „requires some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax.‟” 68
Similarly, for the purpose of judicial jurisdiction, due process requires that a potential
defendant‟s minimum contacts be “such that the maintenance of the suit [against him] does not
offend „traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.‟” 69 Although the Court conceded
that in Bellas Hess it had “suggested” that physical presence within the state was necessary in
order to satisfy the minimum contacts test,70 it emphasized that the Bellas Hess decision
preceded the subsequent, substantial evolution of its due process jurisprudence in the realm of
judicial jurisdiction. 71
The most significant due process development that the Quill Court cited was the
recognition, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,72 that “jurisdiction … may not be avoided
merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum state.”73 In fact, the Court in
Burger King found that “the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat jurisdiction”
has been “consistently rejected.”74 Instead, a court has jurisdiction “[s]o long as a commercial
actor‟s efforts are „purposefully directed‟ toward residents of [the forum] State.”75 In rejecting
the physical presence requirement for jurisdictional due process purposes, the Burger King
opinion specifically noted: “it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial

68

Id. at 306 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
Id. at 307 (quoting Int‟l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
70
Id. at 306-07.
71
Id. at 307.
72
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
73
Quill, 504 U.S. at 307-08 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476).
74
Id. at 308 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476).
75
Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476) (emphasis added).
69
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amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communication across state lines, thus
obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted.” 76
The Court in Quill found this logic also justified “the imposition of the collection duty on
a mail-order house that is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a
State” and affirmatively held that “[t]he requirements of due process are met irrespective of a
corporation‟s lack of physical presence in the taxing State,” thus overruling Bellas Hess‟s due
process holding. 77 Because Quill “purposefully directed” its business activities at North Dakota
and the extent of its contacts with North Dakota residents satisfied the minimum contacts due
process standard, the Due Process Clause did not prevent the imposition and enforcement of use
tax obligations against Quill. 78
b) Commerce Clause Analysis
The Court began its analysis of Quill‟s Commerce Clause challenge by explaining that
the Commerce Clause, in addition to expressly providing Congress with regulatory authority
over interstate commerce, also implicitly prohibits states from taking certain actions that interfere
with or burden interstate commerce. 79 This is known as the “negative” or “dormant” Commerce
Clause. 80 The rule from early dormant Commerce Clause cases was simple: “no State has the
right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form.” 81 Later cases narrowed this rule and
found some burdens on interstate commerce constitutional, but vacillated on the appropriate
standard.82 In 1977, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Supreme Court ultimately

76

Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 746).
Id. (emphasis added).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 309.
80
Id.
81
Id. (quoting Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888)).
82
Id. at 309-10.
77
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rejected its earlier formalistic approaches and instead adopted a four-part test that examines the
“practical effect” of a state tax statute.83
The four-part test established in Complete Auto requires the Court to “sustain a tax
against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the „tax [1] is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.”84 The Court
rejected the North Dakota Supreme Court‟s finding that Complete Auto‟s four-part test “rendered
Bellas Hess „obsolete‟” for two reasons.85 First, although Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, “in
the middle of [the] latest rally between formalism and pragmatism,” the Court found that Bellas
Hess was distinguishable from its earlier formalistic cases because the holding of Bellas Hess did
not rely on the mere “draftsmanship” or “labeling” of state taxes.86 Additionally, the Court
found that Bellas Hess and Complete Auto can be read in harmony: Bellas Hess merely defines
the “substantial nexus” required under Complete Auto‟s first prong.87 The Court found support
for this proposition in National Geographic Society v. California Bd. of Equalization,88 decided
just three weeks after Complete Auto.89 The Court claimed that National Geographic “affirmed
the continuing vitality of Bellas Hess” and its “sharp distinction … between mail-order sellers
[with a physical presence in the taxing] State and those … who do no more than communicate
with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business.” 90

83

Id. at 310.
Id. at 311 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
85
Id. at 310-12.
86
Id. at 310-11.
87
Id. at 311.
88
430 U.S. 551 (1977).
89
Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (citing Nat‟l Geographic Soc‟y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551 (1977)).
90
Id. (citing Nat‟l Geographic, 430 U.S. at 559).
84
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The Court in Quill also rejected the North Dakota Supreme Court‟s assertion that “the
nexus requirements imposed by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are equivalent,” finding
that unique constitutional concerns and policies underlie and support the two different
standards.91 For example, the due process nexus analysis requires “notice” or “fair warning,”
because the Due Process Clause ensures that governmental activity is “fundamental[ly] fair[]”
and “legitimate.”92 In contrast, the nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause serves to protect
the national economy from the any negative structural effects stemming from state regulation of
interstate commerce.93 Accordingly, the first and fourth prongs of the Complete Auto test serve
as an important check on state power to impose taxes that unduly burden interstate commerce by
requiring a substantial nexus and relationship between the tax and state-provided services. 94
Therefore, “contrary to the State‟s suggestion, a corporation may have the „minimum contacts‟
with a taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the „substantial nexus‟
with the State as required by the Commerce Clause.”95
Finally, the Court explained why the bright-line physical-presence test of Bellas Hess is
still good law, despite the Court‟s recent trend away from formalistic tests and toward “a more
flexible substantive approach.”96 The Court concluded that modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence “favor[ing] more flexible balancing analyses” does not automatically overrule all
established “bright-line” tests, particularly those that effectively prevent states from unduly
burdening interstate commerce. 97 Unlike earlier formalistic bright-line rules that distinguished

91

Id. at 312.
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 313.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 314.
97
Id.
92
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merely between the statutory draftsman‟s choice of language, the Court concluded that the
physical-presence rule of Bellas Hess actually furthers the ends of the Commerce Clause by
creating a “safe harbor” for remote vendors.98 While the rule might “appear[] artificial at its
edges,” that is not dispositive, as the rule‟s “artificiality… is more than offset by the benefits of a
clear rule,” particularly in the realm of state taxation where various precedents often create a
“quagmire.”99
Because the Bellas Hess rule “ha[d] engendered substantial reliance,” the Court found
there was “continuing value” in having a bright-line rule. 100 Based on that continuing validity
and principles of stare decisis, the Court held that the Commerce Clause ruling of Bellas Hess
remains good law. 101 Because the Court clarified that only the Commerce Clause, and not the
Due Process Clause, requires a physical presence, the Court explicitly invited Congress to use its
regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause and consider “whether, when, and to what
extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”102
3. Implications
The holding of Quill is clear: the dormant Commerce Clause—but not the Due Process
Clause—prohibits states from requiring out-of-state vendors without a substantial nexus with the
taxing state to collect and remit the state‟s use tax. Under Quill and Bellas Hess, the substantial
nexus requirement is only met by satisfaction of the bright-line physical presence rule.
Unfortunately, today, with the emergence of e-commerce, Quill applies to an incredible number
of remote vendors, as its holding extends beyond its facts to any interstate vendor without a

98

Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 315.
100
Id. at 317.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 318-19.
99
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physical presence in the taxing state, not just mail-order businesses. However, two aspects of
Quill should give even its greatest critics hope: (1) its due process holding and (2) the Court‟s
rationale for upholding the physical presence requirement of Bellas Hess.
One of the most important aspects of the Quill opinion, often glossed over by its critics, is
its due process holding. In Quill, the Court expressly rejected the idea that the Due Process
Clause prevents states from imposing use tax obligations on remote sellers, merely because those
vendors lack physical presence within the taxing state. By requiring only that the vendors satisfy
the much lower “purposeful direction” standard, the Court practically eliminated any due process
concerns from consideration. Even more importantly, as acknowledged in its opinion, by
“putting [the due process] problem to rest,” “Congress is now free to decide whether, when, and
to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use
taxes.”103 While Congress does not have the authority to permit states to infringe the due process
rights of interstate actors, Congress can constitutionally regulate interstate commerce, which
includes the power to expressly authorize the states to burden interstate commerce in certain
ways. The Quill decision, as opposed to Bellas Hess, is accordingly much less constitutionally
restrictive and gives states the opportunity to either lobby Congress or seek to undermine the
“burden” rationale of the Court‟s Commerce Clause analysis.
The Court‟s two rationales for upholding the physical-presence requirement of Bellas
Hess were “the continuing value of a bright-line rule” and stare decisis. This means that states
can undermine the Quill decision by attacking the weaknesses of either or both of these
rationales. The Court found that the benefits of the bright-line rule outweighed its artificiality.
Those benefits centered on encouraging settled expectations and the fact that the rule had
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engendered substantial reliance. However, given the massive amounts of lost revenue stemming
from Quill‟s prohibition, the incredible growth and strength of the e-commerce industry, and the
burden and inequality confronting Main Street retailers, who must collect and remit the tax, the
Court might find that the benefits of the bright-line rule might no longer outweigh its artificial
edges, were the question to come before the Court again. The Court‟s other rationale is also
susceptible to attack. Although stare decisis is an important principal, it only makes sense to
uphold an earlier rule that is still relevant and controlling today. While the Court in Quill
rejected the North Dakota Supreme Court‟s argument that the technology and industry of 1992
were sufficiently different from Bellas Hess to warrant overruling it, the time might be ripe today
in the face of the e-commerce industry. Regardless, states can also seek to avoid stare decisis in
a more indirect way—by undermining the rationale provided in Bellas Hess, states also weaken
Quill‟s reliance on Bellas Hess.
III. Overturn Quill - The Federal Approach
A senator first requested Congress accept the Supreme Court‟s invitation and provide a
national solution to the states‟ remote vendor problem only two years after the Court‟s Quill
decision.104 On February 3, 1994, Senator Dale Bumpers introduced Senate Bill 1825, known as
the Tax Fairness for Main Street Business Act of 1994.105 The bill was read twice and referred
to the Committee on Finance where it died. 106 The bill never made it back to the Senate floor for
a vote.107 Over the years, Congress has continuously failed to act on the issue despite the
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introduction of relevant bills in the House or Senate almost annually. 108 This has resulted in
Congress upholding a destructive public policy that disadvantages local businesses, undermines
state and local governments by reducing their tax revenues, and makes a regressive tax even
more regressive, as those who can take advantage of the internet retailers‟ tax exemption are only
those with internet access, a credit card, and a home or workplace that allows them to accept
daytime deliveries.
In 2011 alone, members of Congress have introduced four bills—Senate Bill 1832, House
Bill 3179, Senate Bill 1452, House Bill 2701—that would remedy this flawed public policy and
grant states the authority to require certain remote vendors, particularly e-retailers, to collect and
remit sales or use tax to participating states. 109 All four of these bills have been referred to
committee,110 although it is doubtful whether any will make it past the committee and
subcommittee stage, much less become law given the historical treatment of these types of
proposals and the current anti-tax political climate. All four bills require states seeking to collect
tax from remote sellers to implement a simplified system for the administration of their sales and
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use tax collection.111 Senate Bill 1452 and House Bill 2701 act by simply granting Congress‟s
approval to a preexisting voluntary state agreement known as the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement, allowing the agreement to become binding.112 In contrast, House Bill 3179 contains
its own simplification requirements for states wishing to impose a collection obligation on
remote vendors and does not require states to become member states of the State Sales and Use
Tax Agreement.113 S.B. 1832 is a hybrid of these two approaches: it grants authority for tax
collection to Member States of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement while
simultaneously providing an alternative simplification procedure that non-member states can
choose to instead implement.114
A. The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement
The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (the “SSUTA”) is the cooperative
product of the Streamlined Sales Tax Project, a multistate effort organized by the National
Governors Association and the National Council of State Legislatures to provide a simplified
sales and use tax system that is neutral, efficient, certain and simple, effective and fair, and
flexible. 115 Forty-four states joined in the creation of the SSUTA, which operates as “a sort of
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model tax code” that adopting states can “adapt to reflect their individual choices.” 116 Twentyfour states—including Oklahoma—have passed legislation conforming their state and use tax
codes to the requirements of the SSUTA.117 The SSUTA improves tax administration in three
major ways: (1) code simplification; (2) more efficient administration procedures; and (3) the use
of emerging technologies, such as databases and administrative software. 118
Adoption of the SSUTA results in code simplification because the SSUTA requires
“uniform tax definitions; uniform and simpler exemption administration; rate simplification;
state-level administration of all sales taxes; uniform sourcing (where the sale is taxable); and
state funding of the administrative cost.”119 Uniformity greatly benefits businesses operating in
SSUTA member states by reducing administrative expenses and decreasing uncertainty. 120 It
allows businesses to look to only one source for exemption definitions, limits the number of tax
rates businesses must learn and apply, and permits business to file only a single tax return with
each state in which it operates, which prevents business from having to deal with a multitude of
state and local governments and all their differing requirements.121 Administration is also made
simpler through the use of technology. 122 For example, each member state must provide a
database with the tax rate for each of its local jurisdictions, matched up with the nine-digit zip
codes in each local jurisdiction to ensure that businesses are clear on what rates apply in each
116
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area.123 Furthermore, SSUTA states partner with the one of six certified companies in the private
sector to supply sales tax administration software that makes it simple to calculate the tax owed
on each purchase in each jurisdiction.124 The SSUTA states bear the cost of this service for any
business without a physical presence in the state, in addition to compensating businesses for
other reasonable expenses incurred in the collection of sales tax. 125
The SSUTA is a voluntary agreement, both in the sense that states voluntarily choose to
become full members by adopting compliance legislation and also that remote vendors with
customers in member states volunteer to collect and remit tax. 126 Member states can provide
vendors with incentives to collect the tax—both by diminishing the accompanying burden and by
offering more direct advantages like amnesty on previously unremitted taxes—but they cannot
force sellers to comply. 127 However, three of the bills pending before Congress would change
that by ratifying the SSUTA, 128 which would transform the SSUTA into “an interstate compact
with the force of federal law,” enforceable against remote vendors. 129 For example, Senate Bill
1832 authorizes SSUTA member states “to require all sellers not qualifying for a small seller
exception to collect and remit sales and use taxes with respect to remote sales sourced to that
Member State pursuant to the provisions of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement.” 130
Ratifying the SSUTA is a common tactic in relevant federal bills because of its
simplicity—congressional representatives advocating for this method do not have to reinvent the
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wheel, but merely advocate for the ratification of an agreement that has existed for over a
decade.131 This approach has broad support. For example, the Marketplace Fairness Act, which
would ratify the SSUTA, had bipartisan support in its sponsorship when it was introduced last
November. 132 Additionally, the National Governors Association, the National Conference of
State Legislatures, the Federation of Tax Administrators, the Multistate Tax Commission, and
many large retailers support the SSUTA.133 The Streamlined Sales Governing Board promotes
the SSUTA as an equalizer for remote vendors and local “brick-and-mortar” stores. Others have
endorsed the SSUTA as an alternative to the piecemeal, constitutionally questionable laws
adopted by some states in response to frustration with the lack of another option. 134 Opponents,
however, include state and local governments who fear that the cost of compensating for
administrative expenses will exceed the corresponding increase in revenue. 135 Additionally,
some have raised concerns about state sovereignty and self-determination of state tax policy,
which the uniformity requirements of the SSUTA threaten. 136
B. The Non-SSUTA Bill: The Marketplace Equity Act of 2011
Despite the popularity of the SSUTA ratification approach, one of the bills introduced
this year approaches the problem of crafting a national solution slightly differently. Like the
other bills, the Marketplace Equity Act of 2011 authorizes electing states to require remote
vendors to collect and remit sales and use taxes with respect to their sales to customers within
131
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those states.137 However, to be an “electing state,” states do not have to become members of the
SSUTA; instead, they can act “individually or through an agreement with one or more of the
several States, to satisfy the [simplification] requirements of subsection (b).” 138 This approach
gives states a little more flexibility in deciding how exactly to proceed.
Section 2, subsection (b) sets out the simplification requirements electing states must
satisfy and provides an exception for “small sellers.” Specifically, “remote sellers with gross
annual receipts in the preceding calendar year from remote sales of items, services, and other
products in the United States not exceeding $1,000,000 (or such greater amount as determined by
the State involved) or in the State not exceeding $100,000 (or such greater amount as determined
by the State)” are exempt from the collection and remittance obligation imposed on other remote
vendors by subsection (a).139 The bill‟s simplification requirements include: (1) a single revenue
authority to which remote sellers can submit a single tax return for all of its statewide liability;
(2) a non-discriminatory, uniform tax base throughout the State; and (3) the use of one of three
provided rate structures140 that produces a non-discriminatory rate, or a rate that is not higher
than the respective rate for sellers other than remote sellers. 141
The simplification system of House Bill 3179 and the SSUTA share many characteristics.
The most notable difference is merely that House Bill 3179 does not require states to join the
interstate agreement to take advantage of the ability to require remote vendors to collect and
137
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remit tax. Whether through ratification of the SSUTA or adoption of a bill like House Bill 3179,
there is significant reason for Congress to take action on this issue: the substantial loss of
revenue confronting states, the necessity of avoiding piecemeal legislation, and the guarantee of
constitutionality. However, given the number of bills already proposed and the current anti-tax
climate, it is unlikely that any of the bills currently in committee will have a much greater chance
of success than their predecessors. However, given that the “federal solution” remains the best
one, and the recent support from companies like Amazon in response to state legislation, 142
Congress should seriously consider moving forward on the issue of state sales taxation and ecommerce.
IV. Current State Efforts to Challenge Quill
After waiting in vain for a federal solution, several states have taken steps on their own to
challenge Quill and resolve the problem of Internet tax avoidance. Most states have sought to
either attribute sufficient nexus to the remote vendors143 or require the out-of-state seller to
provide information to the consumer and the state regarding use tax liability for non-taxed
purchases. 144 The effectiveness and probable constitutionality of the different laws vary.
A. Attributed Nexus
Quill and Bellas Hess require a vendor to have substantial nexus—meaning physical
presence—with a taxing state before that state can require the vendor to collect and remit use
tax.145 However, an understanding of two other Supreme Court decisions are necessary to
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complete the nexus framework: Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,146 and Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v.
Washington State Department of Revenue.147 In both cases, the Court attributed nexus to the outof-state seller based on actions of affiliated, soliciting third parties.
In Scripto, the Supreme Court rejected a dormant Commerce Clause argument and
upheld the imposition of Florida use tax collection duties on Scripto, a Georgia corporation, even
though the company did not have (1) an “office, distributing house, warehouse, or other place of
business in Florida, or (2) have any regular employee or agent there.”148 The nexus between
Scripto and Florida consisted of ten “advertising specialty brokers,” or “wholesalers or jobbers,”
each of whom was a Florida resident “actively engaged in Florida as a representative „of Scripto
for the purpose of attracting, soliciting and obtaining Florida customers‟ for [Scripto‟s
business].”149 The Court found it irrelevant for nexus purposes that the “jobbers” were not
regular employees of Scripto since they were “conducting continuous local solicitation” on
Scripto‟s behalf. 150 Twenty-seven years later, relying on Scripto, the Court in Tyler Pipe
Industries similarly held that a company could not defeat a showing of sufficient nexus by
delineating its sales representatives “independent contractors” instead of “agents.” 151 The Court
concluded instead that the “crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in
[the] state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the taxpayer‟s ability to
establish and maintain a market in [the] state for the sales.” 152
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Based on Scripto and Tyler Pipe Industries, states have passed laws attempting to
attribute nexus to an out-of-state or pure Internet seller, based on the presence and activities of
affiliates located in the taxing state. States have attempted to attribute nexus to previously
unreachable vendors either by using the vendor‟s in-state web affiliates (the “New York”
approach) or in-state organizations in a commonly owned group with the vendor (the
“California” approach).
1. Website Affiliates - The New York Approach
Some large Internet retailers like Amazon.com and Overstock.com have developed
programs to allow independent third parties, known as “associates” or “affiliates,” to advertise
the retailer‟s website on the associates‟ own websites and to receive a commission for related
purchases, pursuant to an agreement or contract between the retailer and associate. 153 Visitors to
the third-party associates‟ websites can click on the link or banner advertising the Internet
retailer, which will redirect the visitor to the retailer‟s own website.154 If the visitor then makes a
purchase from the retailer, the retailer pays the associate a commission. 155
In 2008, New York sought to capitalize on these associate programs by using them to
attribute nexus to previously unreachable pure Internet retailers. New York‟s tax code already
required “every vendor of tangible personal property” to collect sales and use tax.” 156 The term
“vendor” included … [a] person who solicits business … by employees, independent contractors,
agents, or other representatives… and by reason thereof makes sales to persons within the state
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of tangible personal property or services, the use of which is taxed.” 157 On April 23, 2008, New
York amended its tax statutes “to reflect the reality that many sales of goods to New York
residents are effected [sic] through the Internet.”158 The amendment created a rebuttable
presumption that retailers using an associate program were “soliciting business [in New York]
through an independent contractor or other representative,” 159 which under Scripto and Tyler
Pipe Industries would constitute sufficient nexus, as the independent contractor‟s physical
presence would be attributed to the retailer on whose behalf it solicited. More specifically, the
amendment stated:
[A] person making sales of tangible personal property or services taxable under
this article (“seller”) shall be presumed to be soliciting business through an
independent contractor or other representative if the seller enters into an
agreement with a resident of [New York] under which the resident, for a
commission or other consideration, directly or indirectly refers potential
customers, whether by a link on an internet website or otherwise, to the seller, if
the cumulative gross receipts from sales by the seller to customers in [New York]
who are referred to the seller by all residents with this type of an agreement with
the seller is in excess of ten thousand dollars during the preceding four quarterly
periods … This presumption may be rebutted by proof that the resident with
whom the seller has an agreement did not engage in any solicitation in the state on
behalf of the seller that would satisfy the nexus requirement of the United States
constitution during the four quarterly periods in question. 160

The amended New York statute thus has two key components: the solicitation
presumption and the requirements for rebuttal. 161 The first component, the presumption, has a
triggering mechanism. To incur use tax collection responsibility under section 1101(b)(8)(vi),
the out-of-state Internet seller must first enter into an agreement with a resident of New York. 162
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That agreement must be a commission-based referral agreement, rather than a flat-fee advertising
contract.163 Aggregated together, all such agreements entered into between the Internet seller
and New York residents must have generated more than $10,000 of gross receipts during past
four quarterly periods from sales to customers located in New York, that were referred to the
seller by the New York associate.164 If all of these requirements are met, the presumption will
activate, and the Internet retailer will be obligated to collect and remit use taxes based on its use
of in-state residents to solicit business from other New York residents, unless the seller can
satisfy the rebuttal standard. 165
Sellers can rebut the presumption of in-state solicitation by providing proof that during
the four quarterly periods in question, the seller‟s New York associates “did not engage in any
solicitation in [New York] on behalf of the seller that would satisfy the nexus requirement of the
United States constitution.”166 Because the statute itself did not provide guidance to sellers on
how to prove the lack of solicitation, a negative, the Department of Taxation and Finance issued
a second memorandum on June 30, 2008,167 which instituted a two-part “safe harbor” procedure
for sellers.168 First, to rebut the presumption, sellers must include a “no solicitation” clause in
their agreements with each New York associate. 169 If each resident associate‟s contract stated
that the representative was prohibited from “engaging in any solicitation activities in New York
State that refer potential customers to the seller,” the seller would have satisfied the first portion
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of the “safe harbor” procedure.170 Second, to ensure rebuttal, the sellers would also have to
require each in-state associate to submit a signed certification each year, stating that the associate
had not engaged in any such prohibited solicitation during the preceding year. 171 If the seller
satisfied both parts of the “safe harbor” procedure, the seller would be considered to have
effectively rebutted the presumption of in-state solicitation, and thereby would remain free of
any use tax obligations.172
Two days after the Governor signed New York‟s “Amazon Law,” amending section
1101(b)(8) of the tax statutes, plaintiff Amazon.com, LLC 173 filed suit, alleging violations of the
Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, in addition to
several other claims. 174 The trial court granted the State‟s motion to dismiss on January 13,
2009.175 In rejecting Amazon‟s facial Commerce Clause challenge, the court focused on the
careful crafting of the law: that the law targeted out-of-state sellers using in-state contractors,
ensured there was sufficient nexus, and provided an “out” for sellers by allowing them to rebut
the statutory presumption of vendor qualification. 176 Because Amazon did not rebut the statutory
presumption by alleging “its New York Associates do not solicit business for it from New York
customers,” the court also dismissed Amazon‟s as-applied Commerce Clause challenge.177 The
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court found Amazon‟s Due Process Clause challenge to the presumption equally unconvincing,
reasoning that “[t]here is a „reasonably high degree of probability‟ that New York business
people and entities desirous of raising money that are compensated for referring customers who
ultimately make purchases will solicit business from those with whom they are familiar and
encourage sales. 178 Amazon appealed. 179
On appeal, the reviewing court whether New York‟s law violated the Commerce and Due
Process Clauses facially and as-applied to Amazon and Overstock, another online retailer that
had filed suit. 180 The court began by analyzing the parties‟ facial challenges in light of the high
standard facing plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of a statute.181 After finding that the
parties‟ Commerce Clause challenges implicated only the first prong of the Brady test182—the
substantial nexus requirement—the court relied on Matter of Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal
of the State of New York,183 for the proposition that “while a physical presence of the vendor is
required, it need not be substantial.” 184 Thus, “the conduct of economic activities in the taxing
State performed by the vendor‟s personnel or on its behalf” may manifest the necessary physical
presence.185 Based on this approval of attributed nexus, the court concluded “that on its face, the
statute does not violate the Commerce Clause” because “it imposes a tax collection obligation on
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an out-of-state vendor only where the vendor enters into a business-referral agreement with a
New York State resident, and only where that resident receives a commission based on a sale in
New York.”186 In upholding the law, the court specifically looked to three factors: (1) the
requirement that the in-state presence must involve solicitation, not mere advertising; (2) that the
law provided a “ready escape hatch” through the “safe harbor” rebuttal procedure; and (3) that
New York had a “legitimate basis” for concluding that in-state representatives are likely to solicit
business when paid on a sales commission basis. Because the court could recite “a set of
circumstances under which the law would be valid”—when a seller‟s New York representative
with sufficient in-state presence receives a commission for proactively soliciting sales—the
facial Commerce Clause challenge failed.187
Both of the parties‟ facial Due Process Clause challenges—the “irrational and
irrebuttable presumption” and “void for vagueness” arguments—also failed.188 Citing Quill, the
Appellate Division court distinguished the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause nexus
requirements and applied the less burdensome “minimum contacts” due process test.189 The
court then considered the claims of “irrebuttable presumption” and “vagueness” more
specifically. 190
Amazon and Overstock first argued that section 1101(b)(8)(vi) was unconstitutional
because it contained an “irrational and irrebuttable” presumption. Section 1101(b)(8)(vi) of the
New York Tax Law presumes that an in-state representative paid on commission is incentivized

186

Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
Id. at 139.
188
Id. at 139-41.
189
Id. at 139-40.
190
Id. at 140-41.
187

32

to proactively solicit sales in order to generate greater pay. 191 After conceding that the Supreme
Court disfavors irrebuttable presumptions “as violative of due process,” the court recognized
that many rebuttable presumptions are frequently upheld, so long as there is “a rational
connection between the basic facts proven and the ultimate fact presumed.”192 New York‟s Due
Process Clause requires a presumption to satisfy the standard of a “reasonably high degree of
probability that the presumed fact follows from those proved directly.” 193 However, even under
the higher standard, the court found the statutory presumption constitutional because “it is not
irrational to presume that the [seller‟s] in-state representative will engage in various legal
methods to enhance earnings,” including solicitation.194 Any representatives behaving in a
contrary fashion can prove that they did not engage in solicitation, thus helping the seller avoid
use tax collection obligations.195 The parties also made a “void for vagueness” due process
argument based on the words “or indirectly,” “or other consideration,” and “solicitation,” which
the court quickly dispensed with, noting that it found the parties‟ criticisms “perplexing” as the
phrases presented no cause for confusion. 196
Amazon and Overstock fared better on their as-applied challenges, as the Appellate
Division found that the lack of discovery and undeveloped record precluded them from making a
determination on both the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause “presumption” claims. 197
For purposes of the Commerce Clause challenge, the court remanded for discovery, holding that
it was unable “to conclude as a matter of law” that plaintiff‟s in-state representatives were
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actually “engaged in sufficiently meaningful activity”—solicitation, rather than merely
advertising—and that those activities were “„significantly associated‟ with the out-of-state
retailer‟s ability to do business in the state,” as required by Tyler Pipe Industries.198 Similarly,
for due process purposes, the court remanded to allow Amazon and Overstock to challenge the
validity of the statutory presumption by evidencing that “all their in-state representatives do is
advertise on New York-based Web sites.”199
No other court has yet reviewed the constitutionality of section 1101(b)(8)(vi); therefore,
New York‟s law remains in-force for the time being. It is unclear if the Supreme Court will
grant certiorari and review the New York courts‟ Commerce Clause and Due Process holdings.
However, the Court‟s language in Quill inviting Congress to act is reason to believe that the
Supreme Court might deny any petition for certiorari or at least delay in taking the case. 200 Until
a higher court sanctions this type of “Amazon law,” it might be wise for states to be wary of
passing similar legislation. Although several other states have already passed or considered
legislation styled on New York‟s law,201 such a move can be risky and expensive. For example,
the Tax Foundation warns that “Amazon Laws” can result in more costs than benefits because
such laws often fail to generate revenue and actually result in losses as online retailers simply
end their affiliate programs in those states, mire the state in expensive litigation, can be seen
placing disproportionate collection burdens on Internet sellers, and create uncertainty and
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increase compliance costs for businesses. 202 Based on the potential risks and the uncertainty
surrounding a New-York-style Amazon Law, states should first consider other approaches before
adopting similar legislation.
2. Common Ownership Nexus - The California Approach
When California enacted its “Amazon Law” in 2011,203 it had the benefit of other states‟
experiences and was able to borrow ideas and incorporate them into its statute. In one section of
its two-part statute, California adopted a modified form of the “New York” approach and
amended its definition of “retailer engaged in business in this state” for the purpose of sales and
use tax collection duties.204 The new definition includes out-of-state retailers entering into
commission-based agreements with California residents who refer potential customers with a
link on their websites, so long as the remote vendor had $10,000 in cumulative referred sales of
tangible property to California purchasers and $1,000,000 in total cumulative sales of tangible
personal property to customers in California in the preceding year.205 California expressly
provided that section 6203(c)(5) is inapplicable to advertising-only agreements and requires
solicitation to become operative; thus, it does not apply to those retailers who can demonstrate
that their in-state affiliate did not engage in referrals in a manner that would satisfy the
requirements of the Commerce Clause. 206 California defined “retailer” for the purpose of section
6203(c)(5) to include “an entity affiliated with a retailer within the meaning of Section 1504 of
202
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the Internal Revenue Code,” meaning that it attacked the online affiliate programs of Internet
retailers even more broadly than New York because it not only allowed in-state affiliates‟
solicitation activities to be attributed to the retailer they contract with, but also to any company
affiliated with that retailer under Internal Revenue Code section 1504. 207
In the second portion of its “Amazon Law,” California chose to attack a different
avoidance technique of Amazon‟s—entity isolation and the use of in-state subsidiaries. Amazon
has a history of “aggressive” tax planning, 208 as evidenced by its decision to establish its
headquarters in Seattle, rather than in Los Angeles. 209 Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon,
explained that because companies “have to charge sales tax to customers who live in any state
where [the companies] have a business presence,” “[i]t made no sense for [Amazon] to be in
California or New York,” given the high populations and high sales potential of those states. 210
However, although Amazon itself does not have a physical presence in California, it does have
several subsidiaries in the state: A2X Development Centers, with locations in Cupertino (dba
Lab126), Orange County, San Francisco, and San Luis Obispo (dba ZME); A9.com, in Palo
Alto; and Alexa, located in San Francisco. 211 California thus decided to attribute to Amazon the
nexus of its subsidiaries, with those entities‟ operations in California thereby satisfying Quill‟s
physical presence requirement.212
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Similar to how it handles web-based affiliates, California‟s statute attributes the nexus of
subsidiaries to a parent by expanding the definition of a “retailer engaged in business” in
California.213 Under California Revenue and Tax Code section 6203(a), every “retailer engaged
in business in [California] and making sales of tangible personal property for storage, use, or
other consumption in [California], not exempted … shall, at the time of making the sales or … at
the time the storage, use, or other consumption becomes taxable, collect the tax from the
purchaser.” Subsection (c) defines “[r]etailer engaged in business in [California]” as “any
retailer that has substantial nexus with [California] for the purposes of the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution and any retailer upon whom federal law permits this state to
impose a use tax collection duty.”214 The Code then provides a non-exclusive list of examples of
such retailers. 215
One type of retailer included in section 6203(c) is a retailer that is part of a commonly
controlled group that represents a combined reporting group for purposes of California‟s
corporate income tax if another member of that commonly controlled group, “pursuant to an
agreement with the retailer, performs services in [California] in connection with tangible
personal property to be sold by the retailer, including, but not limited to, design and development
of tangible personal property sold by the retailer, or the solicitation of sales of tangible personal
property on behalf of the retailer.”216 Section 25105 defines a “commonly controlled group” in
terms of majority ownership: if a parent owns “more than 50% of the voting power” of its
subsidiary, or if “the same person” owns or constructively owns “stock representing 50% of the
voting power” of brother/sister corporations, then the corporations will be considered part of a
213
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commonly controlled group.217 Section 6203(c)(4) does not require an agency relationship
between the commonly owned companies to trigger its application. 218
The California legislature seemingly designed this portion of 6203(c) to ensnare Amazon
specifically, perhaps responding to Amazon‟s refusal to collect use taxes even in states, such as
California, where it has a “substantial physical presence” in the form of its or its subsidiaries‟
headquarters, warehouses, customer service centers, or research and development facilities. 219
For example, Lab126, an Amazon subsidiary in Cupertino, California, developed and designed
the Kindle,220 Amazon‟s e-reader. Amazon consistently refuses to disclose how many Kindles it
has sold, instead issuing vague press releases about its Kindle sales, such as claiming that the
Kindle‟s growth rate recently tripled, 221 that its new Kindle is “the bestselling product in
Amazon‟s history,”222 or that the Kindle 3 is “the fastest-selling ever.”223 In 2010 however,
analysts estimated that Amazon had sold millions of Kindle devices and that Kindle sales
accounted for 3-5% of Amazon‟s total revenue, meaning that Amazon could have generated $1.7
billion in Kindle sales in 2010. 224 Despite the phenomenal success of the Kindle, Amazon has
refused to collect use tax from purchasers of its Kindle e-reader and books in California, the
217
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birthplace of the Kindle. The California law seeks to change this practice by attributing the
physical presence of subsidiaries like Lab126 to their parent, Amazon, in order to subject
Amazon to sales and use tax collection duties under Quill and Scripto.
Given Amazon‟s immediate opposition to the new California law, the state legislature
agreed to delay implementation of the law for one-year to give Congress a chance to write and
pass federal legislation resolving the states‟ use tax collection conflicts with e-commerce. 225 If
Congress does not act within the next year and the new version of section 6203 becomes
operative, Amazon is sure to file suit challenging the law‟s constitutionality, as it did in New
York, or act to limit its liability under the new law. Such actions could effectively result in an
immediate compromise of the law‟s intended goals. For example, Amazon, along with fellow
Internet retailer Overstock, has already responded by cutting ties with thousands of its California
affiliates, saying it “had no plans to begin collecting California sales taxes.” 226 The actions of
online sellers in either terminating their affiliate programs or forbidding those associates from
soliciting business in a manner that triggers section 6203 raises questions of futility because
without a trigger, the retailer will not have a statutory obligation to collect use taxes, and the
state will continue to lose revenue. 227
There are also doubts about the constitutionality of California‟s approach, apart from the
questions of its potential effectiveness. The constitutionality of the “common ownership”
approach depends on whether the courts will allow states to ignore the separate and distinct legal
status of the different entities in a commonly owned group. The new version of section
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6203(c)(4) will allow California to treat Amazon as a retailer operating in California obligated to
collect California sales and use taxes because of its wholly owned subsidiaries in California, like
A9.com and Lab126.228 Amazon‟s situation differs from that of National Geographic because in
that case National Geographic itself actually maintained a California office—albeit a different
department than its mail order business—with National Geographic employees, meaning that
National Geographic itself had a physical presence in California. 229 Conversely, Amazon‟s
subsidiaries are separately incorporated, legally distinct companies with their own employees,
meaning that Amazon itself does not have a physical presence in California. 230
In Scripto and Tyler Pipe Industries, the Supreme Court allowed states to attribute the instate physical presence of an out-of-state seller‟s representatives to the out-of-state seller.231
However, in both cases, the representatives the states used to attribute nexus acted as the
retailers‟ agents.232 Section 6203(c)(4), in contrast, does not require an agency relationship
between the subsidiary and principal before attributing the physical presence of one to the
other.233 This might be a problem for California because Amazon‟s subsidiaries are “legally
separate persons from Amazon,” who “have kept their corporate identities separate and intact”
and who have their own operations, assets, and payrolls. 234 Although A9.com and Lab126
“produce products … that are integral to Amazon‟s business,” that alone does not rise to the
level of agency found in Scripto or Tyler Pipe Industries and it is possible that the Supreme
Court will make agency, rather than just common ownership, necessary to satisfy the dormant
228
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Commerce Clause.235 Therefore, the constitutionality of California‟s “common ownership”
approach remains in doubt, even now, before the effective date of the new law.
B. The Information Approach - The Colorado Example
Colorado has attacked its sales and use tax problem in a manner quite distinct from that
of New York or California. First, while New York‟s law presumes that an online seller is
physically present in New York because of the presence of its in-state web-based affiliates,
Colorado pioneered the “common ownership” approach later modified and adopted by
California: the law presumes that an remote retailer is physically present and “doing business in
[Colorado]” if it and another company with physical presence in Colorado are both members of
the same commonly owned group.236 Second, while both New York and California focused on
ways to force Internet retailers to collect and remit taxes, Colorado‟s law instead requires
Internet retailers to collect and remit information.237
Colorado imposes a 2.9% tax on the purchase price of all retail sales of tangible personal
property made after January 1, 2001.238 The “retailer” or “vendor” selling the property is “liable
and responsible for the payment” of the tax imposed.239 In Colorado, a “retailer” or “vendor” is
“a person doing business in [Colorado], known to the trade and public as such, and selling to the
user or consumer, and not for resale.”240 A retailer is a person “doing business in [Colorado]”
when it sells, leases, or delivers tangible personal property in Colorado by retail sale. 241 This
definition of “doing business in [Colorado]” includes maintaining a place of business in
235
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Colorado, whether directly or indirectly, and soliciting business in Colorado through any
means.242 It also creates a rebuttable presumption243 that a retailer is doing business in Colorado
if that retailer “does not collect Colorado sales tax” and is “part of a controlled group of
corporations” that includes “a component member that is a retailer with physical presence in
[Colorado].”244 This provision means that a remote vendor in a brother-sister or parentsubsidiary relationship with an in-state retailer will be presumed to also be “doing business in
[Colorado]” for the purposes of Colorado‟s sales and use tax statutes.245
Retailers that do business in Colorado but do not collect Colorado sales tax are known as
“non-collecting retailers.”246 In order to increase use tax compliance by individuals making
remote purchases, Colorado imposes notice and reporting obligations on such non-collecting
retailers.247 The non-collecting retailer‟s obligation is threefold: (1) time of sale notice to the
purchaser; (2) annual notice to the purchaser; and (3) annual reporting to Colorado‟s department
of revenue. 248
First, with each purchase, non-collecting retailers must notify all Colorado purchasers
that the retailer does not collect Colorado sales tax, that the purchase is not exempt merely
because it was made by remote means, and that the purchaser has a duty to file a sales or use tax
242
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return with the state and pay use tax on their purchase from the retailer. 249 Retailers are subject
to a five-dollar penalty for each failure to provide the required notice. 250 The amended Colorado
statute also imposes annual information obligations on retailers not collecting Colorado sales
tax.251 Non-collecting retailers must send each Colorado purchaser 252 an annual statement by
January 31 that states the total amount that the purchaser paid for all Colorado purchases made
from the retailer in the previous calendar year. 253 The statement must be sent by first class mail;
be prominently labeled “Important tax document enclosed;” summarize purchase dates,
descriptions, and dollar amounts; advise the purchaser that the law requires the retailer to provide
the Colorado Department of Revenue with the purchaser‟s total dollar amount of purchases; and
again notify the purchaser of his or her obligation to file a Colorado state or use tax return. 254
Failure to provide annual statements to Colorado purchasers results in a ten-dollar penalty for
each notification failure.255 The retailer must also file a similar annual statement for each
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purchaser with the Colorado department of revenue, 256 subject to a ten-dollar penalty for each
purchaser that should have been included in such annual statement but was omitted.257
Colorado‟s information approach could serve as an interesting model for other states
attempting to close the gap in their sales and use tax revenue created by e-commerce and other
remote purchases. However, there are two obstacles for other states seeking to adopt the
Colorado approach: (1) uncertain constitutionality and (2) ineffectiveness. Before this year, it
seemed possible that Colorado‟s version of an “Amazon law” would be found constitutional: it
relied on the physical presence of a component member in the same group of controlled
corporations as the retailer—satisfying the dormant Commerce Clause—and created a
presumption that is both rational and rebuttable—comporting with due process.258 However, on
March 30, 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado held the Colorado
law unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement.259
The Direct Marketing Ass‟n court found that Colorado‟s reporting requirements violated
the dormant Commerce Clause both by discriminating against and placing an undue burden on
out-of-state retailers.260 With respect to the discrimination claim, the court acknowledged that
“[o]n their face the Act and Regulations do not distinguish between in-state retailers… and outof-state retailers. Rather, the Act focuses on the distinction between retailers who collect
256
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Colorado sales tax and those who do not collect Colorado sales tax.” 261 However, the court
reasoned that because Colorado law already requires all in-state retailers to collect sales tax,
functionally, the notice and reporting requirements only apply to out-of-state retailers.262 This
results in “patent discrimination,” since the statute and its regulations “produce, in effect, a
geographic distinction between in-state and out-of-state retailers” in violation of the Quill
doctrine and the Commerce Clause. 263 The court found this discrimination to exist despite “the
veil provided by the words of the Act and the Regulations.” 264 Colorado‟s legitimate state
interests and purposes were not sufficient to overcome this discrimination, given that Colorado
did not rebut the plaintiff‟s proffered reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. 265 Moreover,
the court found that because “the sole purpose of the burdens imposed by the Act and
Regulations is the ultimate collection of use taxes when sales taxes cannot be collected,”
Colorado‟s law is unduly burdensome because “the burdens imposed by the Act and the
Regulations are inextricably related in kind and purpose to the burdens condemned in Quill.”266
Even assuming the Tenth Circuit reverses the District Court and holds Colorado‟s
reporting requirements constitutional on appeal, there is still a problem with the law‟s
effectiveness. It is possible that the disclosure requirements could allow Colorado to audit and
seek payment from individuals owing the tax far more effectively. The law‟s effectiveness,
however, depends on its reach. Ironically, Amazon, for whom the law is named, would not fall
within the law‟s scope because Amazon does not have the necessary direct or indirect
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presence—neither Amazon nor any of its subsidiaries have a physical presence in Colorado. 267
One analyst goes so far as to refer to Colorado‟s “self-help” law as something of mere “symbolic
value,” claiming it is “superfluous” to those conventional retailers who already collect state sales
taxes because of their physical presence in the state and will have only a limited affect on many
Internet retailers because its reach only extends to those remote vendors who have at least an
indirect physical presence in Colorado through their subsidiaries or other commonly owned
group members. 268 Furthermore, just because a state would receive information about remote
purchasers under this approach, “it is not clear how [this receipt] will transfer into revenue,” as
“states may not have the resources to receive and properly analyze such an enormous quantity of
reports.”269 Accordingly, there is an argument that Colorado‟s law, like New York‟s or
California‟s, will never be effective and that only a uniform federal solution, rather than a
piecemeal state-by-state approach, will resolve the e-commerce sales and use tax controversy. 270
V. Reinterpret Quill
Traditionally, those commenting on Quill are detractors who malign it as an outdated
decision that severely constricts states and ravages their revenues and budgets in the Internet age.
However, a different paradigm has recently emerged, one that actually views the Quill decision
as providing “an ideal framework for determining when states should be allowed to subject
remote e-commerce vendors to sales and use taxation.”271 The idea is that only the reporting or
compliance costs stemming from the imposition of tax collection and remittance duties on the
out-of-state vendor burden interstate commerce in derogation of the dormant Commerce Clause,
267
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not imposition of the duties themselves.272 Therefore, adequate compensation from the states for
the reporting and compliance costs incurred by remote vendors “would completely alleviate the
burden on interstate commerce,” resulting in a “constitutionally permissible approach for
partially subjecting remote vendors to use taxes.”273 This approach points out that Quill provides
two justifications for its physical presence rule: the dormant Commerce Clause and stare
decisis.274 Adequate compensation would remove both justifications from the analysis because it
would eliminate the burden on interstate commerce; therefore, it would attack the underpinnings
of Bellas Hess, the case the Quill court cited as precedent.275
The dormant Commerce Clause does not require states to give remote vendors or ecommerce sellers an advantaged position. 276 Instead it only prevents states from disadvantaging
such sellers in a way that burdens interstate commerce. Consequently, remote vendors are not
entitled to continue enabling consumer tax avoidance and taking advantage of the tax loophole
created by Quill if there is a way to require them to collect the tax due the state without
subjecting them to a burden of higher aggregate compliance costs than local sellers. 277 The
problem facing remote vendors, as noted by the Court in Bellas Hess and Quill, is that remote
vendors face a “virtual welter of complicated obligations” because of their presence in multiple
taxing jurisdictions.278 The Quill court found that remote vendors were at a significant
disadvantage when compared with local sellers because a remote vendor could potentially be at
the mercy of “6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions,” all with different rules and obligations, while a
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local seller has the much simpler duty of complying with the single jurisdiction in which it is
located.279
The remedy, then, is for states to alleviate this burden before subjecting remote vendors
to tax. Instead of passing controversial legislation or lobbying for Congress to ratify the SSUTA,
something that remains unlikely, states could simply interpret Quill as only restricting them from
imposing use tax collection duties on remote vendors if those vendors are not adequately
compensated by the state “for all such compliance costs imposed.” 280 While compensated
remote vendors would maintain a slight advantage over uncompensated local vendors, they
would no longer be able to use tax avoidance to create a price advantage. 281 Additionally,
although states would have to fully compensate e-sellers and other remote vendors—at an
estimated cost of about 1-3% of tax revenues raised—this result would still be a substantially
greater income, or approximately 97% of the revenue from e-commerce taxes, where now they
receive little, if any at all. 282 The loss of revenue from compensation payouts would give states
an added incentive to simplify their tax administrative systems on their own, in their own way,
rather than in a fashion mandated by the SSUTA or Congress. 283 The sellers could be
compensated in a simple manner: allow remote vendors to “keep a specified percentage of the
use tax amounts they collect” as compensation for their compliance costs or reimburse sellers for
the “actual verifiable” amount they expend to comply. 284 The best approach, and one that would
be the easiest for states to administer, would be a combination method where vendors
279
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automatically keep a set percentage of the tax collected but have the option of demonstrating
“actual verifiable compliance costs” in excess of the amount kept to receive additional
corresponding compensation. 285
This approach has value in that it avoids the litigation, controversy, and economic
consequences of passing individual, piecemeal “Amazon” laws at the state level. It also has the
advantage of self-implementation, something important to states in the face of Congress‟s
continuing disinterest and failure to act. However, it does come with the risk that the Court will
disagree with the states‟ “interpretation” of Quill and rule against states using this method, based
on the principle of stare decisis, despite the argument that compensation distinguishes this
approach from Quill or Bellas Hess. At the very least, this interpretation of Quill contributes
something novel to the debate over e-commerce and sales and use taxes and is certainly
something states should consider, particularly those that do not already have some sort of
compensation scheme to incentivize vendors to voluntarily assume collection and remittance
obligations.
VI. Conclusion
Quill Corporation v. North Dakota has produced almost two decades of controversy.
Ideally, Congress would accept the Supreme Court‟s invitation and take action to provide a
national solution to the sales and use tax crisis many states are confronting. However, while
Congress refuses to act, there are solutions for states interested in immediate action. While it is
inadvisable for more states to adopt “Amazon” laws until the New York and Colorado laws are
fully upheld, states can join the SSUTA or create compensation programs to add incentivize
voluntary compliance. Over the next few years states can learn which approaches seem the most

285

Id., manuscript at 24.

49

likely to pass constitutional muster, and adopt them. Finally, given the increasing amount of
attention to this issue, perhaps much-needed change will come and finally bring state tax codes
into the Internet age.
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